

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W

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P 302020Z OCT 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2162

INFO DOD WASHDC

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 5774

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 30, 1973 (SALT TWO - 331)

FOLLOWING ARE TRANSLATIONS OF (1) SEMENOV STATEMENT AND  
(2) REPLIES BY TRUSOV AND SHCHUKIN TO U.S. QUESTIONS ON  
ARTICLE XI AND ARTICLE III OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT,  
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1973.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, OCTOBER 30, 1973

I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE SPEECH BY  
L.I. BREZHNEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
OF THE CPSU, BEFORE THE WORLD CONGRESS OF PEACE FORCES  
IN MOSCOW ON OCTOBER 26, 1973. THE APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE  
OF THE HIGHEST AUTHORITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE PROBLEMS  
OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE, PREVENTION OF WAR AND THE STRUGGLE  
TO STOP THE ARMS RACE AND LIMIT ARMS, SET FORTH BY L.I.  
BREZHNEV, LIES AT THE BASIS OF THE COURSE PURSUED BY THE  
SOVIET SIDE AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL. MUCH IN THIS SPEECH  
HAS A DIRECT BEARING ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS  
AND WE WOULD LIKE THE U.S. SIDE TO KEEP THESE IMPORTANT  
PRONOUNCEMENTS IN MIND.

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THE DESIRE OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR STRENGTHENING PEACE  
AND SECURITY, FOR INTERNATIONAL DETENTE AND FOR REACHING AGREE-  
MENT ON MUTUAL MEASURES TO HALT THE ARMS RACE AND LIMIT  
ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS--THESE ARE

ORGANICALLY INTERRELATED ELEMENTS OF A SINGLE WHOLE, I.E., THE PEACE-LOVING FOREIGN POLICY COURSE OF THE SOVIET STATE, DETERMINED BY THE VERY NATURE OF OUR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEM. THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR HALTING THE ARMS RACE AND FOR ARMS LIMITATION ARE A MOST IMPORTANT COMPONENT PART OF THE PROGRAM OF PEACE ADVANCED BY THE 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU. THESE PROPOSALS ARE BASED ON A GENUINE INTEREST IN STRENGTHENING PEACE AND CONSOLIDATING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL DETENTE. THIS ALSO FULLY APPLIES TO THE PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY THE SOVIET SIDE AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

THE SOVIET DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT TABLED OCTOBER 9, 1973 PROVIDES FOR EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. COMING TO MUTUAL AGREEMENTS ON THE MEASURES PROPOSED IN THE SOVIET DRAFT AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WOULD NO DOUBT PUT AN END TO COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WOULD ENSURE EQUAL SECURITY FOR THE SIDES AND WOULD THUS CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY. BEYOND ALL DOUBT, SUCH MEASURES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WOULD BE IN THE LONG-TERM VITAL INTERESTS OF NOT ONLY THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR AND THE U.S., BUT ALSO OF THEIR ALLIES AND ALL STATES AND PEOPLES OF THE WORLD.

ADOPTION OF FURTHER MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE AN EXTRAORDINARILY IMPORTANT NEW CONTRIBUTION TO REINFORCING THE TURN IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS FROM CONFRONTATION TO DETENTE, NORMALIZATION AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS COOPERATION, WHICH BEGAN AS A RESULT OF THE SUMMIT MEETINGS IN MAY 1972 AND JUNE 1973.

IN ASSESSING THE STATE OF AND PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, L.I. BREZHNEV IN HIS SPEECH OF OCTOBER 26, 1973 SAID "AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE DOCUMENTS ADOPTED IN 1972 AND 1973 HAVE CREATED A FOUNDATION FOR MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS COOPERATION  
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WITH UNDOUBTED BENEFIT FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

AS YOU KNOW, THERE IS TO BE AN OFFICIAL VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE SOVIET UNION IN 1974. WE WOULD WANT IT TO BE MARKED BY NEW MAJOR STEPS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR STATES AND BY IMPROVEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE.

A ROLE OF NO SMALL SIGNIFICANCE CAN BE PLAYED BY SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE NEW PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION AND POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT THIS IS NO SIMPLE TASK, BUT WE HAVE AGREED TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ACCOMPLISH IT."

CLEARLY THIS TASK CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED AS A RESULT OF THE EFFORTS OF JUST ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE SIDES. THIS PROCESS, TO DEVELOP AND CULMINATE IN SUCCESS, REQUIRES SERIOUS EFFORTS ON THE PART OF BOTH SIDES AND REQUIRES A MANIFESTATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND REALISM ON A FIRM BASIS OF MUTUAL TRUST.

AS WAS STRESSED BY L.I. BREZHNEV, WE CANNOT BUT GIVE DUE CREDIT TO THOSE STATESMEN WHO ARE STRIVING TO OVERCOME THE MOMENTUM OF THE "COLD WAR" AND TO ENTER UPON THE PATH OF ENHANCING THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS AND DEVELOPING MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS PRECISELY SUCH A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE, OF WHICH OUR NEGOTIATIONS, TOO, ARE AN IMPORTANT MANIFESTATION, THAT IS IN ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF MAINTAINING AND CONSOLIDATING PEACE ON EARTH AND CONSEQUENTLY IS ALSO IN ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF ALL STATES, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM OF WHICH THEY ARE A PART. THIS IS THE MAIN TREND IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BASED ON OBJECTIVE FACTORS OF PROFOUND AND LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE. WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN THIS AREA, AND MUCH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED, IS ONLY THE INITIAL STAGE IN THE MOVEMENT TOWARD THE GOAL WHICH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED--RELIABLY ENSURING A LASTING PEACEFUL FUTURE FOR MANKIND.

AT THE SAME TIME, IN ASSESSING THE POSITIVE MOVEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AND IN PROMOTING ITS FURTHER DEVELOPMENT, IT WOULD BE TOTALLY UNREALISTIC TO IGNORE THE FACT THAT THE DEVELOP-  
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ING PROCESS OF DETENTE EVOKES THE FIERCE RESISTANCE OF THE ADVOCATES OF THE "COLD WAR" WHO, USING VARIOUS PRETEXTS, TRY TO PROVE THE NECESSITY FOR A FURTHER BUILD-UP IN ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS, AND TO CARRY OUT PROGRAMS FOR SUCH A BUILD-UP IN AN ACCELERATED MANNER. ONE CANNOT FAIL TO SEE THAT EVEN UNDER CONDITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL DETENTE SUCH A PROCESS CONSTITUTES MATERIAL PREPARATION FOR WORLD WAR.

THE MILITARY BUDGETS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH-ATLANTIC BLOCK INCREASE BY TWO TO THREE BILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY, AND BEHIND THESE FIGURES ARE EVER NEWER TYPES OF IMPLEMENTS OF ANNIHILATION--NEW AND INCREASINGLY MORE DESTRUCTIVE NUCLEAR BOMBS AND SHELLS, NEW AND INCREASINGLY MORE POWERFUL MISSILES, TANKS AND AIRCRAFT, WARSHIPS AND SUBMARINES. QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS OF WEAPONS HAS ATTAINED PREVIOUSLY UNHEARD OF PROPORTIONS. THE ENORMOUS STOCKS OF MEANS FOR THE EXTERMINATION OF HUMAN BEINGS, NEVER SEEN BEFORE THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF MANKIND, WHICH STAND IN READINESS AT LAUNCH SITES, ARE LOCATED ABOARD PATROLLING AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES, OVERFLOW WAREHOUSES AT MILITARY BASES ALL OVER THE GLOBE, ARE AS L.I. BREZHNEV SAID, MODERN "POWDER MAGAZINES," CAPABLE OF BLOWING UP THE WHOLE PLANET.

IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS IS IN ACCORD WITH NEITHER THE SPIRIT OF THE TIMES NOR THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY. FURTHER EXPANSION OF THE ARMS RACE AND FULFILLMENT OF THE TASK OF LIMITING ARMAMENTS ARE TWO OPPOSING TRENDS. "IF WE WANT DETENTE AND PEACE TO BE LASTING, "L.I. BREZHNEV EMPHASIZED, "THEN IT IS NECESSARY TO STOP THE ARMS RACE." AS WE KNOW, THE TASK OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS TO WORK OUR PROVISIONS FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W

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P 302020Z OCT 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2163

INFO DOD

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IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE ATTEMPTS OF CERTAIN CIRCLES TO JUSTIFY SPURRING THE PROCESS OF BUILDING UP ARMAMENTS, BY ASSERTING THAT THEY WOULD PURPORTEDLY HELP ACHIEVE SUCCESS AT THE ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS BY CREATING "BARGAINING CHIPS" FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED. IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT IN ADDITION TO SPURRING THE ARMS RACE THESE "BARGAINING CHIPS" WILL IN ACTUAL FACT PRODUCE NOTHING. AS FOR ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS, WHAT IS NEEDED FOR THEIR SUCCESS IF NOT NEW MILITARY PROGRAMS BUT A SINCERE DESIRE TO CURB THE ARMS RACE, REINFORCED BY MUTUAL RESTRAINT.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

IN DRAWING THE ATTENTION OF THE U.S. SIDE TO THESE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS THE USSR DELEGATION WAS GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO CLARIFY THE APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE PROBLEMS BEFORE US AT THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE MOTIVES UNDERLYING THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. WE HAVE DONE THIS, GUIDED BY OUR

DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE IN EVERY WAY TO ACCOMPLISHMENT OF  
THE TASK AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE SIDES AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL,  
NAMELY, TO MAKE SERIOUS EFFORTS TO WORK OUT THE PROVISIONS  
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OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF SIGNING  
IT IN 1974.

GENERAL TRUSOV'S STATEMENT, OCTOBER 30, 1973

IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTION ASKED BY THE U.S.  
SIDE ON ARTICLE XI OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT, CONCERN-  
ING POSSIBLE APPEARANCE IN THE FUTURE OF SOME NEW STRATEGIC  
OFFENSIVE ARMS, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THE FOLLOWING.

WE ARE ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF  
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS IS PRECISELY THE TASK WHICH  
IS DETERMINED IN THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF  
NEGOTIATIONS. BOTH THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT AS A WHOLE  
AND ITS INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES, INCLUDING ARTICLE XI, ARE AIMED  
AT IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS TASK.

THE DRAFT CONTAINS APPROPRIATE ARTICLES WHICH PROVIDE  
FOR SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON EXISTING TYPES OF SUCH ARMS AS WELL  
AS FOR THE PROHIBITION OF OTHER KNOWN TYPES MENTIONED IN  
ARTICLE XI.

AT THE SAME TIME, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE UNLIMITED  
DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT WE ARE TO WORK OUT, ONE CANNOT  
FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT IN THE FUTURE THERE MIGHT APPEAR  
NEW STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS NOT COVERED BY THE PRESENT AGREE-  
MENT, INCLUDING THOSE BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES.  
IN THE INTERESTS OF ENSURING THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS  
OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES THAT  
A PROVISION BE INCLUDED TO COVER THIS EVENTUALITY, IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH WHICH THE QUESTION OF BANNING OR LIMITING SUCH ARMS  
WOULD BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION AND AGREEMENT IN  
ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE XIII OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. OF  
COURSE, MEASURES FOR THE LIMITATION OF SUCH ARMS SHOULD  
BE WORKED OUT ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY  
AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH IS RECOGNIZED  
AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

SUCH A PROVISION, WE ARE CONVINCED, MEETS THE TASK  
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OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MOST ADEQUATELY. OTHER  
INTERPRETATIONS, AIMED AT A POSSIBILITY OF UNLIMITED DEPLOY-  
MENT OF FUTURE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF ONE KIND OR ANOTHER,  
WOULD NOT BE IN LINE WITH THIS TASK.

THE WORKING OF ARTICLE XI OF THE SOVIET DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT IS IN ITS ESSENCE ANALOGOUS TO THE PROVISIONS AGREED UPON DURING CONCLUSION OF THE ABM TREATY. THESE PROVISIONS ARE BASED ON ONE AND THE SAME IDEA, NAMELY: TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE AGREED LIMITATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME ARTICLE XI OF THE SOVIET DRAFT OF OCTOBER 9, 1973 REFLECTS THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THEREFORE PROVIDES THAT IN THE EVENT THAT NEW STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SHOULD APPEAR IN THE FUTURE, THE SIDES MAY AGREE ON BANNING OR LIMITING THEM. HAVING IN MIND THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, SUCH WORDING FOR THE ARTICLE APPEARS TO BE JUSTIFIED.

ACADEMICIAN SHCHUKIN'S STATEMENT, OCTOBER 30, 1973

THE U.S. SIDE HAS ASKED A QUESTION ON PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE III OF THE SOVIET DRAFT CONCERNING "LIGHT" AND "HEAVY" ICBMS.

FIRST OF ALL, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT QUESTIONS RELATED TO "LIGHT" AND "HEAVY" ICBMS WERE THE SUBJECT OF COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION IN THE COURSE OF WORKING OUT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. AS A RESULT THE SIDES ARRIVED AT THE PROVISIONS IN FORCE, CONCERNING LIMITATION OF "LIGHT" AND "HEAVY" ICBM LAUNCHERS AND VERIFICATION OF THESE LIMITATIONS.

THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 9, 1973 CONTAINS APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AS WELL AS ON NOT CONVERTING LAUNCHERS FOR "LIGHT" ICBMS INTO LAUNCHERS FOR "HEAVY" ICBMS. THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN LAUNCHERS FOR "LIGHT" ICBMS AND LAUNCHERS FOR "HEAVY" ICBMS BY USE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SIDES, AS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE XVI OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 11 MAY 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 30 OCT 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** boyleja  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 XGDSI  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
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**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** boyleja  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 17 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <17-Aug-2001 by elyme>; APPROVED <26-Sep-2001 by boyleja>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SEMENOV STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 30, 1973 (SALT TWO - 331)  
**TAGS:** PARM  
**To:** STATE INFO DOD  
MOSCOW  
NATO  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005